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I. Introduction
On December 22, 2008, the contents of an enormous impoundment containing coal-ash slurry from the Tennessee Valley
Authority's (TVA) Kingston Fossil Fuel Plant poured into the Emory River. The proximate cause of the spill was the bursting of
a poorly reinforced dike holding back a pit of sludge that towered 80 feet above the river and 40 feet above an adjacent road. 1
The volume and force of the spill were so large that 1.1 billion gallons of the inky mess flowed across the river, inundating 300
acres of land in a layer four to five feet deep, uprooting trees, destroying three homes, and damaging dozens of others. 2  The
catastrophic breach ruptured a gas line, caused millions of dollars in property damage, and caused incalculable environmental
damage to the Emory River and its receiving water, the Clinch River. 3  A week after the spill, heaps of gray material *94
remained in the river like small volcanic islands. 4  Miraculously, no one was killed. 5
The slurry contained both fly and bottom ash, collectively known as “coal combustion residuals” (CCRs) in the euphemistic
lexicon of environmental regulation. 6  Because coal-fired power plants have scrubbers that trap fumes before they are emitted
into ambient air, the fly-ash portion of the spill contained significantly more than the quota of toxic heavy metals that typically
result from burning coal. 7  Or, in other words, in an inevitable but ironic twist, the benefits to breathers were obtained at the
expense of walkers and drinkers. TVA later estimated that the Kingston Spill had released around 2.6 million pounds of toxic
pollutants into the Emory River. 8  By way of comparison, all of the other power plants in the United States released just over
2 million pounds of toxic pollutants during all of 2007. 9  Cleanup costs for the federally subsidized TVA, one of the largest
electric utilities in the country, are expected to total $1.2 billion, adding $0.69 per month to the utility bills of nine million
customers until 2024. 10
The Kingston spill was the worst of its kind in U.S. history, but it was not the first, nor would it be the last. For a brief period
of time, the catastrophe focused the nation's attention on the health and environmental risks posed by dumping coal ash in
unlined pits in the *95  ground referred to as “surface impoundments.” 11  Prominent national environmental groups demanded
greater protection from Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), both of which had long skittered away
from confronting the problem in the face of unyielding resistance by electric utilities to any hint of regulatory intervention that
would compel the safer disposal of coal ash and the reinforcement of old, poorly designed, and carelessly maintained coal-
ash dumps. 12
In the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe, Congressman Nick Rahall (D-WV) introduced a bill that would have authorized
the Department of Interior to promulgate uniform federal design, engineering, and performance standards for new coal-ash
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impoundments. 13  Three congressional committees devoted six hearings to the need for proper regulation of coal-ash wastes. 14
Notably, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson promised to reevaluate by the end of 2009 the agency's decades-old reluctance to
regulate the disposal of some 129 million tons of coal ash generated annually, 15  a startling figure when compared to the 250
million tons of every category of household garbage that Americans generated in 2010. 16
*96  Jackson met this deadline. 17  But her efforts were thwarted when an intensive industry lobbying campaign provoked the
White House to rewrite the EPA proposal, adding two significantly weaker options and derailing the momentum of Jackson's
proposal. 18  The 111th Congress failed to enact protective legislation and, in the aftermath of the 2010 mid-term election that
transferred control of the House of Representatives back to the Republican Party, the 112th Congress nearly enacted legislation
that would have divested the EPA of its authority to adopt strong coal-ash rules. 19  Four years after Kingston, the federal
government has yet to take action despite another large spill into Lake Michigan. 20  To the extent that such disposal is regulated
at all, it is subject only to erratic and often ineffective state regulatory controls. 21
In the past, catastrophic events like the Kingston disaster have resulted in dramatic governmental reforms, pushing the law
forward to meet new challenges and provide expanded protection for public health and the environment. Congress enacted most
of the regulatory statutes of the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and the Public Interest Era 22  after widely publicized tragedies
or abuses stirred public opinion to levels sufficient to overcome the inertia that otherwise overwhelms *97  Congress and the
regulatory agencies. 23  For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reacted to the Three Mile Island near-meltdown in
1979 by putting into place much stricter regulatory requirements for power plants. 24  The Federal Aviation Administration
has developed a set of new airline safety requirements following nearly every major passenger airplane crash. 25  The EPA
asked for and received authority from Congress to regulate fugitive releases from chemical plants following the December 1984
explosion at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India that killed 2,000 people. 26
But in the context of more recent history, the passive response to the Kingston spill was not an outlier. The past decade
has witnessed a confluence of crises across a broad array of federal regulatory programs. The response by Congress and the
regulatory agencies to most of these multiple crises has been tepid at best. The Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill of
April 2010 generated no new legislation, and the regulatory response amounted only to a modest reorganization and renaming
of the agency that had utterly failed--and is still failing--to regulate deepwater oil and gas drilling. 27  The Upper Big Branch
(UBB) mine disaster in the same month likewise generated no new legislation and no significant regulatory reforms. 28  Even
when crises did stimulate Congress to act, the changes were by no means dramatic. The Consumer Product Safety Improvement
Act (CPSIA) of 2008 did little to enhance the Consumer Product Safety *98  Commission's (CPSC) capacity to reduce the
risks posed by imported products, and Congress soon amended the statute to provide broad exemptions from its lead-poisoning
prevention requirements for existing toys. 29  The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2010 left much of the responsibility for
protecting the public from contaminated food in the hands of food producers subject to oversight by a resource-starved FDA,
and it did nothing at all to cure the overlapping jurisdiction, misplaced priorities, and weak enforcement that have plagued food-
safety regulation since the early twentieth century. 30
This recent history raises the question of why the twentieth-century dynamic of crisis and reform has apparently disappeared
in the early twenty-first century. Using the Kingston catastrophe as a case study, this article offers several explanations for this
unfortunate trend. We argue that regulated industries dominate regulatory debates on Capitol Hill and at the federal agencies to
an unprecedented extent. Rather than stressing the importance of science-based rulemaking, the White House has engaged in
its own intemperate interventions, upping the ante for flexing raw political muscle at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. The
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growing weakness of the media's investigative reporting has exacerbated both trends. 31  In the end, these factors have sparked
the deeply disturbing evolution of the administrative process into a kind of “blood sport.” 32  This degeneration's most obvious
and immediate threat is to our shared “commons,” 33  but over the long run it is equally likely to cause irrevocable harm to
individual businesses and to the efficient functioning of regulated markets.
Part II examines what we know about the Kingston spill and the implications of that information for a recurrence of such events.
Part III explains how the EPA and Congress responded to this disaster, *99  highlighting how politics driven by a deregulatory
ideology eventually swamped the EPA's deliberative, science-based rulemaking process. Part IV offers some suggestions for
rebuilding regulatory agencies like the EPA and for restoring public trust in government as first steps on the way to a regulatory
regime that is capable of preventing future Kingston tragedies.
II. The Kingston Spill
A. An Engineering Fiasco
For more than half a century, TVA power plant near Kingston dumped its coal ash in a huge, 100-acre impoundment. 34  Like
many other coal-ash surface impoundments, the Kingston facility was built out of the material that it held--compacted coal ash
and earth. 35  Since the dikes that formed the walls of the facility had to stay dry to retain their strength, the slurry dumped into
the pit had to be wet enough to keep the ash from becoming wind-borne, but not so wet that it would weaken the dikes. 36  This
impossibly delicate balance was born of expediency, not sound engineering.
In the immediate aftermath of the spill, TVA CEO Tom Kilgore blamed the spill on heavy rain and freezing temperatures just
prior to the breach. 37  Anticipating litigation, TVA's general counsel hired AECOM, a geotechnical-engineering consulting
company with expertise in forensic analysis, to conduct a study of the “root causes” of the spill. 38  The firm concluded that the
spill was caused by a combination of four conditions--a layer of unstable “slime” composed of ash and silt eighty feet below
the surface of the impoundment, the high water content of the sluiced ash, the increasing height of the ash, and the construction
of sloping dikes over the wet ash. 39  The study concluded that although the impoundment was “on the verge of failure,” TVA
employees had *100  observed “no visible signs of distress . . . that would have indicated that a deep-seated failure was about
to occur.” 40
Critiques soon emerged challenging the credibility of AECOM's findings. Earthjustice charged that the consultant had failed
to examine whether the company's negligence played any role in the collapse. 41  TVA's Inspector General (TVA IG) later
said that one reason for commissioning the AECOM study was to lessen legal liability. 42  The consultant was told specifically
“not to judge TVA employees and contractors” in determining the spill's cause. 43  According to the senior manager of TVA's
Coal Combustion Byproducts group, TVA wanted AECOM to point the finger at circumstances that the company could not
control. 44  The TVA IG concluded: “[l]itigation strategy seems to have prevailed over transparency and accountability” to the
point that the AECOM study put too much weight on the “slime” theory and insufficiently emphasized the TVA's institutional
failures. 45  An engineering consultant hired by the TVA IG concluded that “AECOM's emphasis on the “slime layer . . .
inappropriately diminishe[d] the role that the design and operation of the Kingston ash pond played in the spill.” 46
A technical advisory panel assembled by the Governor of Tennessee to investigate the Kingston catastrophe agreed with
AECOM that “the weak foundation interface layer likely did contribute to the failure that occurred,” but added that “the stability
*101  of the Kingston dredge cells” was at a “critical state of failure regardless of the presence of the emphasized layer of
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weak foundation material.” 47  The panel further concluded that a “critical deficiency” at the facility was “an apparent lack of
understanding or consideration of the evolutionary process of the construction at the TVA Kingston plant.” 48  In addition, TVA
lacked an “on-going, consistent method of design evaluation, documentation and communication to manage the evolutionary
process.” 49  “[T]he types of materials used in the construction of the Kingston dredge cell were assumed to perform similarly to
conventional soil materials,” but the sluiced fly-ash materials did not in fact “behave in a manner consistent with conventional
clay and silt embankment construction.” 50
The lack of engineering design for the raising of the cells, the inadequately understood material properties, pore pressure
dissipation properties and material consolidation mechanisms of the ash, the methods of placement of the ash, the staged
upstream construction, and the dredging activities all contributed to the condition of the pre-failure structure. 51
In short, from an engineering perspective, the impoundment was a disaster waiting to happen, and it was attributable to both
technical and institutional failures.
B. Institutional Culture
Severe management problems also undermined TVA's ability to recognize that the Kingston coal-ash pond was unstable. As the
impoundments evolved over the years, the organizational entities within TVA responsible for the safety of the dikes changed,
and the employees responsible for modifying the impoundments no longer adhered to the original design theories for the
facility. 52  Among other things, the original design called for earthen dikes, not dikes made partially out of coal ash. 53  An
expert engineer for adjacent landowners *102  in subsequent litigation concluded that the departure from the original plans
resulted in a dike that was significantly less stable than the original design. 54  He testified that when TVA wanted to raise the
level of the dike in 1975, a consultant's study revealed that the foundation of the original dike failed to conform to the original
design and that the dike therefore became weaker as its height increased. 55
In a comprehensive report to Congress, the TVA IG found that, for more than a decade prior to the spill, managers had received
multiple warnings from employees and consultants raising “red flags” about the safety of the retention pond, but “for reasons
that are still not entirely clear,” they had failed to make “appropriate safety modifications” to address the problems. 56  In
April 1985, a TVA engineer wrote a memorandum to upper-level officials raising his concerns about the stability of Dike C.
The memorandum stated that the actual construction of Dike C did not conform to the design drawings for the dike and that
preventive measures used in building Dike C were insufficient. The memorandum therefore recommended that management
assign someone to inspect Dike C on a daily basis to look for signs of instability. 57  The TVA IG's consulting engineer agreed
that the “safety factor” employed in building the dike was “less than the minimum acceptable value of 1.5” and that TVA's
construction of additional capacity, raising elevations above the original containment dike system, may have further decreased
the margin of safety. 58
Another memorandum, written in 1987, from the TVA's Director of Environmental Quality to the TVA Manager of Policy,
Planning, and Budget stated that, “expansions of ash ponds” had resulted in dikes containing the wet ash becoming “quite high
with increasing risk and consequences of a breech.” 59  To address “the potential for harm to both surface and groundwater from
the failure of a dike,” the memorandum recommended that the “establishment of more specific inspection standards for these
dikes should be examined.” 60  The memorandum triggered a discussion among some *103  TVA officials about “whether
the ash ponds should have been managed under TVA's Dam Safety Program, which would have required substantially more
rigorous inspections and engineering.” 61  Those involved decided not to change these procedures. 62
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Responding to a small, localized leak at the Kingston retention pond in 2003, TVA hired a consulting engineer to conduct a
slope-stability analysis of the pond. The engineer observed “a 7- to 10-foot thick layer of loose ash immediately overlaying
the clay soil beneath the ash pond” that could undergo “liquefaction” under some conditions, including a seismic event. 63
Although the probability of such an event was “extremely low,” the consultant noted that the existing methods for predicting
liquefaction were “insufficient” and recommended that TVA improve the drainage in the pond. 64  Instead of implementing the
recommendation, TVA hired a second contractor, Geosyntec, to undertake a peer review of the disposal plans for the facility
and of the prior consultant's memorandum. 65  Geosyntec concluded that the “potential for liquefaction should be estimated
and, depending on the results of this estimate, a liquefaction analysis may be required.” 66  If the analysis concluded that the
site was likely to liquefy, then “ground improvement techniques need to be implemented.” 67  Upper-level management failed
to respond to this report. 68  A consulting engineer hired by the TVA IG concluded that the Geosyntec report indicated “the
expansion design should have been modified to conform to a more stringent design configuration.” 69  Another expert, hired
by the plaintiffs in the landowner litigation, testified that the Geosyntec report was “virtually saying that the site slopes are not
safe for supporting people or construction equipment.” 70
*104  In the end, the TVA IG identified “systemic problems that ha[d] their genesis in the culture” of the organization. 71
Senior managers “relegated ash to the status of garbage at a landfill rather than treating it as a potential hazard to the
public and the environment.” 72  A TVA-sponsored review by the law firm McKenna, Long & Aldridge identified “culture
failures” that allowed unsafe “conditions to occur and remain undetected or unaddressed.” 73  The McKenna, Long &
Aldridge report described a “siloed” decision-making structure under which “[n]o fewer than four separate TVA divisions
had responsibilities related to the huge utility's coal ash facilities. Although the various responsibilities necessarily overlapped
and were interdependent, communication between the groups was strained and in some instances, non-existent.” 74  The
senior manager in charge of handling coal ash at the facility testified that when leaks were discovered in the dikes, the
engineering department was responsible for identifying the problem and proposing a solution, her department was responsible
for budgeting resources to carry out the repair, and the heavy equipment division was responsible for implementing the fix. 75
With so many groups involved in managing the retention ponds, a “lack of accountability” prevailed--orders were considered
recommendations and engineers responsible for annual inspections made the same recommendations year after year. 76  TVA's
CEO admitted that “[w]ith little sharing of information internally and no clear accountability, a culture was created in which
the management, storage and disposal of coal ash and other combustion products were not seen as significant as other aspects
of TVA's operations.” 77  He agreed that TVA required a change in the “overall culture” of the organization “to improve the
rigor and discipline with which we approach every aspect of our work.” 78
Other institutional, managerial, and cultural deficiencies compounded these fundamental communication problems and
pervasive lack of accountability: TVA did not provide adequate *105  training and education to those responsible for building
and maintaining the CCR impoundments; 79  it did not provide written standard operating procedures for constructing, operating,
and maintaining the retention ponds; 80  it did not pay sufficient attention to quality assurance and quality control with respect
to ash disposal; 81  it devoted inadequate resources to maintaining the coal-ash impoundments; 82  it reacted to seeps (leaks)
and other safety-related problems with inexpensive “fixes” rather than addressing the underlying causes; 83  and its upper-level
management resisted taking safety-related advice from knowledgeable employees. 84  The TVA IG concluded that “TVA was
on notice about safety issues” and that “those safety issues were not addressed by TVA.” 85  Its consulting engineer went a
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step further, concluding that TVA “could have possibly prevented the Kingston Spill” if it had implemented the modifications
recommended in the 2004 Geosyntec report. 86
In the aftermath of the spill, TVA promised fundamental changes, 87  but its public actions give little reason for confidence
that its institutional culture will change anytime soon. Despite the multiple findings of independent investigators, TVA has
relentlessly refused to recognize the full panoply of internal problems that caused the spill. Instead, it has steadfastly maintained
that the dike failure was caused by building the pit over a “slime” layer of loose ash and silt eighty feet below the surface
of the impoundment, a mistake that was made decades ago. 88  This emphasis on the slime theory allows TVA to claim that
current managers were not negligent, 89  and supports self-serving claims by the electric utility industry that the Kingston spill
“was a *106  ‘one-off’ event caused by a condition not believed to be present anywhere else in the world.” 90  TVA's active
participation in the campaign to stifle the EPA's efforts to regulate coal-ash disposal is additional discouraging evidence that its
institutional culture has not changed sufficiently to provide adequate assurance that similar fiascos will not occur in the future. 91
Of course, this pattern of resistance by senior management to repeated warnings of pending disaster is not unique to TVA.
Investigations of other recent disasters reveal similarly troubling, equally lengthy trails of internal recriminations regarding
conditions that were at least as dangerous and that led, just as inevitably, to catastrophes. The most notorious example is BP
(formerly British Petroleum), which had a long and disgraceful history of fatal accidents and environmentally damaging leaks
at its American installations, from corroded and leaking oil pipelines on Alaska's North Slope to the massive explosion at a
Texas City refinery that killed eleven people. 92  The huge corporation was run by executives in London who were focused with
obsessive tunnel vision on reducing operating and maintenance costs. 93  For example, in the wake of the Texas City explosion,
BP hired former Secretary of State James A. Baker III to head up an investigative taskforce to uncover the root causes of the
tragedy. 94  The Baker commission's 2007 report did not equivocate, attributing the accident to a corporate culture that allowed
crucial components of the physical plant to “run to failure” and that penalized workers for expressing safety concerns. 95
In a similar vein, Massey Energy, the company that owned and operated the Upper Big Branch mine (UBB) when a methane
gas explosion killed 29 miners, operated at the margins of the law, amassing literally thousands of violations in the years prior
to the explosion and tying regulators in knots with appeals. Massey has *107  received 3,007 MSHA safety citations since
1995 at the UBB. 96  But the company routinely contested these citations, avoiding correcting the violations and paying the
penalties for months and even years in many instances. In 2009 alone, the company contested 34.7% of the 516 safety violations
it received. 97  Massey also contested another $251,613 in MSHA fines for violating the UBB's ventilation plan, a critical factor
in the explosion. 98  During the years leading up to the accident, Massey was assessed over $2.2 million in fines at the UBB
and had contested about half of that amount. 99  The sheer number of violations strongly suggests that Massey executives knew
of the dangerous work environment at the mine.
Because these and other fiascos have occurred in succession over the course of the last decade, inquiries into the adequacy of the
responsible entity's institutional culture with respect to known hazards have become de rigueur in the wake of catastrophes. Yet
the conclusion to which these investigations invariably lead--that complex industrial operations engaged in high-risk operations
have great difficulty avoiding the devastating consequences of failure--almost never translates into the epiphany that government
must step in both to punish past transgressions and to change the underlying culture. Instead, that obvious implication is shoved
off the table or, in cases when the catastrophe is so damaging that it cannot easily be ignored, the individual perpetrator is
written off as a “rogue” actor whose malfeasance is atypical of the industry.
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For example, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) effectively labeled Massey as a reckless outlier when it accused
the company of “industrial homicide” a year and a half after the UBB explosion. 100  Coal companies also tried to distance
themselves from the explosion by claiming that Massey was an outlier. 101  The industry argued that while fifty-four workers
were killed in Massey mines from 2000 through 2010, the nation's largest coal company, Peabody *108  Energy, had only six
fatalities during that period. 102  This characterization gave solace to the survivors and deniability to the industry by making
Massey the wholly culpable entity, but it ignored the fact that the rest of the mining industry also games the enforcement system
in similar ways, thereby obscuring disasters-in-the-making. For example, according to the House of Representatives Committee
on Education and Labor, mine operators abuse the appeals process to delay compliance and boost revenues. 103  The committee
found that “blanket and indiscriminate” challenges have resulted in a backlog of 16,000 cases involving over $195 million in
fines, allowing “irresponsible mine operators to avoid stiffer penalties.” 104
C. Regulatory Dysfunction
In the absence of any credible industry-wide commitment to take the lessons of the Kingston spill to heart, our focus must shift
to what government was doing to address the problem. Because the EPA does not regulate coal-ash surface impoundments,
states provide the only oversight. The EPA's evaluation of their performance reveals critical failures in key states. 105  And the
track record of state supervision at the Kingston TVA impoundment confirms this analysis.
The Tennessee Department of Environmental Conservation (TDEC) had administered a permit program for surface
impoundments at power plants since the 1980s, but the Kingston impoundment, which began receiving waste in the 1950s, was
effectively grandfathered into the system. TVA did not file its first permit application for the dump site until the mid-1990s,
and the TDEC did not issue a permit until 2000, after the impoundment walls were already nearly 60 feet high. 106  TDEC then
allowed TVA to raise *109  the walls another 20 feet, bringing its total height to 80 feet above the Emory River and 40 feet
above an adjacent road. 107
TDEC conducted quarterly inspections at the Kingston impoundment. The inspections were limited to visual inspections that
lasted about an hour. The inspector filled out a one-page inspection report consisting of a checklist and a small space for the
inspector's comments. 108  The vast majority of the reports from 2002 through May 2008 reported “no violations,” and those that
did identify problems noted that TVA was adequately addressing them. 109  The problems that TVA's consultants identified in
2004 were also identifiable by TDEC inspectors during their quarterly inspections, but they consistently gave the ash-retention
pond high marks for reasons that remain a mystery. 110
The history of the retention pond and the multiple post-spill investigations give no indication that state regulators had any impact
whatsoever on how the facility was constructed, expanded, maintained, or operated. After the disaster, the governor's advisory
board recommended that TDEC promulgate more stringent regulations for such facilities. 111  It urged TDEC to “focus on the
need for guidelines or regulations that will improve life-cycle design requirements and related operational procedures for coal
combustion waste [[facilities]” and “require effective management oversight and thorough engineering design philosophy.” 112
It recommended that the Tennessee legislature amend the Tennessee Safe Dams Act of 1973 to eliminate exemptions for
wastewater-impoundment barriers. It also recommended that the legislature ensure that all dams with high or significant hazard
were adequately regulated with respect to safety and stability. 113  Although the advisory board did not specifically find that the
TDEC program was inadequate, the extensive recommendations for improvement strongly suggest that it was not impressed
with the existing arrangements. Ultimately, the Tennessee legislature enacted legislation prohibiting the state environmental
*110  agency from issuing solid waste disposal permits for new or lateral expansions of existing coal-ash-disposal facilities if
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they did not provide for liners, proper closure, and caps. 114  Unfortunately, this approach did nothing to resolve the national
problem of decrepit coal-ash surface impoundments; it may even have had the effect of driving the disposal of Tennessee
utilities' wastes to other states.
D. Kingston as Precedent
In the wake of the Kingston spill, with EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson's reconsideration of the EPA's non-regulatory approach
making the prospect of strong federal intervention seem possible for the first time, the electric-utility industry was at pains to
distinguish the Kingston spill from any situation that might conceivably be addressed by new rules. “The solution isn't simply
to impose the most burdensome regulation on utilities whose customers would bear the brunt of the cost. In fact, regulating coal
ash as hazardous would not have prevented the December 2008 spill at the nearby Kingston facility,” Dan Riedinger of Edison
Electric Institute (EEI), the industry's primary trade group, told EPA officials at a public hearing in Knoxville. 115  “No one
can downplay the tragedy of the Kingston impoundment failure,” agreed fellow witness Tom Schmaltz, environmental director
of Headwaters Inc., which manufactures heavy construction materials, “but the Kingston impoundment failure and other cases
cited are engineering failures. We must distinguish between engineering failures and the nature of a waste.” 116
Taken together, the two statements mask subtle contradictions. If, as Schmaltz suggested, the only requirement at stake was an
EPA decision to attach a negative terminology to coal ash, he was right that TVA could have kept dumping slurry at Kingston
with impunity and would certainly have ended up at the same place--with a disastrous and expensive spill on its hands that had
not been prevented by the federal rules. On the other hand, why, as Riedinger suggested, would such “regulations” prove so
“burdensome,” motivating such vociferous opposition, if all that was at stake was a label?
*111  In fact, the EPA's original proposal, ultimately published as the strongest of three “options” in the rulemaking notice
that emerged from a lengthy White House review process, would have required that all coal-ash disposal sites meet stringent
construction and siting requirements 117  that might well have prevented the Kingston spill had they been in effect when the
dump was first opened several decades ago. As important, the stringent approach of treating coal ash as a hazardous waste under
Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) would have given the EPA authority to require “corrective
action” at old, unstable surface impoundments so long as those locations continued to receive new waste. 118  And siting brand
new facilities within a reasonable distance of coal-fired power plants is far easier said than done. In short, Reidinger was right
the first time: new, more stringent rules would prove costly precisely because they would have required extensive retrofitting
of old, unstable dumps that are vulnerable to the same engineering failures that caused the Kingston spill.
Consider the following daunting statistics about existing surface impoundments. In the wake of the Kingston spill, the EPA
undertook an investigation of existing surface impoundments' integrity, finding that 109 of 584 such facilities nationwide had
either a “high” or a “significant” hazard potential rating. 119  In addition, 186 of the units were not designed by a professional
engineer. 120  Although the impoundments were designed to last for about 40 years, 56 were older than 50 years old and 360
were between 26 and 40 years old. 121  Moreover, 35 units at 25 facilities had already reported releases, ranging from minor
spills to the massive release at the Kingston facility. 122  Indeed, further scrutiny at the Kingston facility revealed significant
safety deficiencies at a second site on its property. 123
*112  TVA is a corporation owned by the U.S. government, supplying nine million customers, employing 12,000 people,
ranking first among American utilities in energy sales and fifth in generating capacity, and serving Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. 124  As a publicly-owned utility, TVA is immune from the pressures of
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share price and private investment. As a very large electric utility, TVA delivers a crucial product, the manufacture of which is
subject to the same risks of catastrophic equipment and facility failure that confront its for-profit competitors. In other words,
the dangerously myopic institutional culture revealed by the Kingston spill could easily plague other utilities, turning TVA
from a “one off” rogue to an urgent example of bad things to come.
III. The Response: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back
A. The EPA Steps Forward
To the great consternation of the electric-utility industry, the November 2008 election results seemed to change the political
dynamic for regulating the environmental harm caused by power plants. As a young and apparently progressive president
prepared to enter the Oval Office and the Democratic Party assumed control of both houses of Congress, the Kingston
catastrophe raised the profile of coal-ash disposal, with national media filling the dead week between Christmas and New
Year's Day with images of inundated homes and a river covered with grey ooze. The stage was set for an unprecedented federal
response to the root cause of the disaster.
The Environmental Integrity Project, a prominent national environmental group, demanded that the EPA promulgate national
regulations governing coal-ash disposal. 125  Earthjustice, the premier litigating arm of the environmental movement, published
a report entitled Waste Deep: Filling Mines with Coal Ash is Profit for Industry, but Poison for People, detailing the risks posed
by dumping coal ash directly in abandoned mines. 126  More than 100 environmental *113  organizations signed a letter to
newly appointed EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson urging her to “chart a new, responsible course” for regulating CCRs. 127
Jackson was receptive. Calling the Kingston spill “one of the largest and most serious environmental releases in our history,” 128
she announced on March 9, 2009 that her agency was in the process of developing regulations for coal-ash disposal. 129  These
regulations would address the serious problem of unstable surface impoundments. 130  To build a record in support of a protective
proposal, the EPA sent information requests to 150 power plants owned by more than fifty utilities seeking data on the structural
integrity of those units. 131  Agency officials said they hoped to publish a proposed rule by the end of the year. 132
The Kingston catastrophe also generated a great deal of activity in Congress, which held no fewer than six hearings on the
causes of the spill, the nature and scope of the coal ash disposal problem, and methods of preventing a recurrence. 133  Several
members urged the EPA to regulate disposal under RCRA, the premier federal waste *114  disposal statute. 134  Congressman
Nick Rahall (D-WV), the chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee, introduced a bill that would have required the
Department of the Interior to promulgate regulations containing federally enforceable requirements for the storage and disposal
of CCRs. 135
In October 2009, the EPA sent the draft of a proposed rule to Cass Sunstein, the White House “regulatory czar,” known more
formally as the administrator of the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA). 136  That document, referred to here as the “Original EPA Proposal,” stated the agency's intention to regulate coal
ash as a hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA. 137  The draft preamble to the proposal cited two distinct categories of
harm that justified imposing stringent federal controls on disposal: (1) the migration of toxic constituents of the ash into the
environment, especially groundwater; and (2) the probable recurrence of spills like the one in Kingston. 138  In keeping with
the theme of responses to disasters, we *115  focus here only on the second threat. Indeed, we must confess that we have
never fully understood the de-emphasis of potentially massive structural failures by the national environmental community. 139
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Although the pollution of groundwater by coal-ash facilities poses potentially serious, long-term risks, it represents a more
attenuated threat to public health than massive spills. Moreover, the groundwater threat is difficult to quantify without extensive
investigation that requires the installation of expensive monitoring equipment and complicated modeling of the movement of
plumes of contamination within aquifers. In contrast, images of Kingston in the aftermath of the spill, a mere two clicks away
on YouTube, are easy to understand and quite disturbing. 140
The EPA's original proposal would have profoundly changed existing disposal practices. The owners and operators of coal-
fired power plants could no longer have kept sludge in open, unlined pits in the ground, but would instead have been required to
send the ash to landfills and surface impoundments that met far more protective design requirements, including the installation
of liners, impermeable (rain-proof) covers, and leachate-detection systems. 141  The EPA would have been responsible for
determining those design standards, although state regulators would have remained responsible for enforcing individual facility
permits in most places. 142  Federal and state regulators would have had the authority to compel “corrective action” at existing
coal ash impoundments where outmoded designs, imprudent engineering, geography, or other factors created a hazard to public
health or the environment. 143
Yet these changes (and their admittedly steep costs) were not the frame of reference selected by electric utilities and their
allies for a well-funded, politically shrewd, and, in the end, extraordinarily effective campaign against the EPA initiative. Had
the utilities *116  complained about disposal costs, not only would they have isolated themselves, they would have focused
attention on the state of ill-repair of existing facilities, inevitably drawing a stark contrast between huge open pits like the
one TVA operated in Kingston and the new, better-engineered facilities required by the EPA's proposal. Instead, the utilities
recruited an unusually broad cross-section of industry groups to argue that the EPA's proposal would discourage the beneficial
reuse of coal ash with devastating economic consequences. 144  The coalition of opponents included companies using the ash
to make concrete and wallboard, as well as large construction companies using it to line roadbeds. 145  They offered to accept
further regulatory controls on coal-ash disposal, but only if the content and implementation of those requirements were left to
the discretion of individual states--a state of affairs that was in essence the status quo. 146
The EPA estimated that about 37 percent of the 136 million tons of coal ash generated--or about 50.1 million tons--was
beneficially reused in 2008. 147  Because the agency's rulemaking proposal explicitly exempted any and all coal ash subject to
“beneficial reuse”--a wide-open category of purposes that the EPA has not yet defined--opponents were compelled to make
a more elaborate argument. 148  They contended that because coal ash would be labeled a hazardous waste when discarded,
recycled coal ash would pick up a “stigma” in the marketplace. 149  People would be afraid to buy it for any purpose because
someday they might be sued for using it. No one ever explained how consumers would discover that coal ash lay in a road
bed or within a piece of wallboard, much less how individuals would be able to successfully sue manufacturers or construction
companies for tangible harm so long as the toxic elements of the ash remained encapsulated. And, of course, if toxic elements
could escape from *117  such products, the coal ash would have been re-used, but not beneficially.
B. The White House Steps Back
1. Centralized Review in Practice
When the EPA did not retreat in the face of the industry coalition's spirited opposition, business groups took their objections to
OIRA, the obscure but extraordinarily powerful White House unit that Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow once called
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“an office that most people have never heard of.” 150  OIRA is responsible for a potent system of centralized White House
review of regulatory proposals from all the agencies and departments in the Executive Branch.
White House regulatory oversight began at the same time that Congress passed a wide variety of progressive laws protecting
consumers, workers, and breathers from fraud, safety hazards on the job, and pollution. With the notable exception of the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), 151  the most important health, safety, and environmental agencies were created during an
extraordinary period of law reform in the early 1970's that was driven by young people's protests against the Vietnam War and
their parents' concern that, in the absence of a revitalized government, baby boomers would remain perpetually alienated from
their country. 152  The industries brought under the ambit of these ambitious new regulatory regimes successfully demanded
that White House allies of a more conservative bent ride herd over the reformers in the regulatory agencies. From the beginning,
as Professor Robert Percival has noted, *118  the distinctive strategy for the regulated industries was the “inside game,”
negotiating behind closed doors for the changes they desired, while environmentalists, consumer groups, and organized labor
went “outside” to reformers in Congress, publicizing the human costs of the corporate malfeasance they wanted to address. 153
As the ink was drying on the landmark reforms of the early 1970's, the Nixon Administration's Secretary of Commerce, Maurice
Stans, persuaded chief domestic policy advisor John Ehrlichman to establish a taskforce to oversee the EPA's regulatory
activities. 154  This type of oversight continued throughout the 1970's, embraced by Democratic President Jimmy Carter, who
appointed his budget director Bert Lance to spearhead those efforts. 155  At the close of the Carter Administration, Congress
passed two statutes that codified the White House's regulatory role: the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Paperwork Reduction
Act; the second statute established OIRA. 156  The new office was assigned to review any proposal by a government agency or
department to compel individual citizens, private sector entities, and state and local governments to fill out new paperwork. 157
As President Ronald Reagan entered office intent on rolling back regulation, OIRA was available to implement new protocols.
Executive Order (EO) 12,291, 158  issued shortly after the Reagan Administration took office, contained the following trio of
no-nonsense instructions:
1. All covered agencies 159  must refrain from taking action unless potential benefits outweigh potential costs. 160  The agencies
*119  must also consider regulatory alternatives that involve the lowest net cost. 161
2. Agencies must prepare a “regulatory impact analysis” (RIA) containing their cost-benefit analysis for each “major” rule,
defined to include any proposal that would have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more. 162
3. Agencies must send a copy of each proposed and final rule to OIRA before it is published in the Federal Register. 163
Agencies must respond to any concerns raised by OIRA staff. 164
The Reagan Administration spent a great deal of time and political capital fighting with congressional reformers, especially
the generation of bright, young, liberal congressmen elected in the immediate aftermath of Watergate. Henry Waxman (D-
CA) and subcommittee chairman on the powerful House Energy and Commerce Committee, James Florio (D-NJ), took the
lead in resisting deregulation, especially in the context of environmental protection. 165  OIRA was at the forefront of these
controversies. George H.W. Bush continued in the direction set by Reagan, albeit with considerably less sturm und drang. 166
The Democrats' return to the presidency with the election of Bill Clinton assuaged congressional Democrats' opposition to
OIRA, in part because the new administration replaced the Reagan executive orders with an apparently more moderate set of
procedures. 167
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The new Clinton EO 12,866, which persists to this day, authorizes OIRA to review “significant” rules (such as requirements
that would impose economic effects over $100 million annually or “adversely affect” the economy “in a material way”). 168
But it imposes *120  a series of mandatory deadlines for the conclusion of review 169  and instructs OIRA to “make available
to the public” all documents that it sent back and forth to the rulemaking agency or department. 170  These “before-and-after”
documents allow stakeholders to track changes that are made during the review process. President Clinton continued the use of
cost-benefit analysis. 171  As a practical matter, OIRA kept a far lower profile during the Clinton Administration; it stayed out
of the media and sharply decreased its workload, reviewing between 500 and 700 rules annually in contrast to 2,000 and 3,000
under Reagan and Bush. 172  But President Clinton's enthusiasm for a strong OIRA presence made it a bipartisan institution,
entrenching centralized White House regulatory review.
Under President George W. Bush, OIRA returned to the aggressive Reagan model. The new President shrewdly retained
Executive Order 12,866, creating the appearance that he was merely continuing a long-standing tradition. But OIRA returned
with enthusiasm to its higher profile “gatekeeper” role. 173  Under the leadership of John Graham (2001-2006) and Susan
Dudley (2006-2009), OIRA significantly increased the number of “return letters” it sent to the agencies, demanding that they
reconsider regulatory proposals. 174  Economic analysis became the critical factor in deciding the content of rules, especially in
the environmental arena where most were statutorily mandated, with deadlines for their production. 175  Graham rewrote OIRA's
guidance regarding the methodologies agencies must use to conduct cost-benefit analysis to make them far more elaborate. 176
The other Bush II Administration change was OIRA's energetic assertion of jurisdiction over science policy. John Graham
realized that the justification for many of the health, safety, and *121  environmental regulations that economists considered to
be inefficient arose from the “precautionary principle,” which holds that government should not wait for scientific certainty to
take action to control emerging threats. 177  By challenging the protective assumptions government scientists had been making
during the process of assessing risk, Graham and his staff hoped to curtail regulation without admitting that they were making
policy decisions to take a less rigorous approach toward emerging threats. Their efforts had mixed results: OIRA intruded
on all aspects of rulemaking with impunity, but its effort to adopt government-wide guidance specifying how agencies and
departments should perform risk assessments was repudiated by the National Academies of Science, among other critics. 178
Nevertheless, as the Bush II Administration trailed to a close, OIRA was once again in the prominent, albeit controversial role
of riding herd on the agencies and departments--especially the EPA--as those proposals were developed.
During his first presidential campaign, Barack Obama defined the role of government as helping people when they cannot help
themselves, allowing progressives to hope that he would advocate strong policies to reverse the deregulatory neglect of the
Bush II years. 179  The newly elected President sent signals at the outset of his Administration that he would implement such
changes, selecting a roster of experienced and well-respected appointees to head the health, safety, and environmental agencies,
especially Lisa Jackson at the EPA. But the President's enthusiasm waned as seemingly more urgent problems competed for his
attention. He did not fight for badly needed increases in the EPA's deflated budget nor did he support his appointees when they
were attacked by Republicans and conservative Democrats. 180  Most disturbing, he showed no enthusiasm *122  for updating
the outmoded laws that crippled agency efforts to curtail chronic violations. 181
The President's ambivalence towards these agencies was crystallized in his appointment of Harvard Law School professor Cass
Sunstein as OIRA Administrator. Sunstein was well-known in academic circles as a critic of the precautionary principle and a
supporter of quantitative cost-benefit analysis. 182  Business groups and conservative commentators hailed his appointment. 183
And it was easy to see why. In the aftermath of the 2010 midterm elections, with radical conservatives in the House of
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Representatives launching the most withering campaign against the regulatory system since Newt Gingrich's 104th Congress,
Sunstein helped President Obama pivot to a new strategy that attempted to deflect the accusation that his Administration was
hostile to business by launching his own version of a regulatory witch-hunt.
*123  In January 2011, President Obama took the unusual step of publishing a Wall Street Journal column pledging to establish
a “21st-century” system that would eliminate “dumb” rules and avoid “excessive, inconsistent, and redundant regulation.” 184
New EO 13,563 followed on the heels of this pronouncement, directing agencies to develop plans for identifying “outmoded,
ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome” rules and “to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them.” 185  The
President reiterated these instructions in a second EO a year later, further ordering agencies to move to the front of the line
any new rules that would reduce “cumulative” regulatory burdens on a given industrial sector. 186  Supervised closely by OIRA
administrator Sunstein, the agencies struggled to find poster children for overregulation that, once identified and publicized,
would have the effect of admitting that the originating agency had done some very stupid things in the past. 187  Ironically,
despite the significant impact these initiatives had on slowing the Obama Administration's rulemaking efforts, 188  conservative
critics on Capitol Hill and in the business community gave President Obama no *124  credit whatsoever for blunting the impact
of “job killing” regulation. 189
2. Coal Ash Protections and the “Stigma Effect”
Despite the impression created by its broad jurisdiction and aggressive assertions of control over regulatory policy, OIRA is a
small office, with about three dozen “desk officers” and “branch chiefs” responsible for reviewing some 700 regulatory matters
annually. 190  OIRA reviews both proposed and final rules, and given the complexity of many of these rules, its career employees
use what is best described as deterrence-based review: they single out a handful of controversial rules for well-publicized
attention, thereby signaling that agencies better have covered all their cost-benefit bases and placated their most committed
industry foes long before their paperwork hits the economists' desks. Coal ash is a prominent example of this strategy.
Almost as soon as rumors of the EPA's ambitious proposal to declare coal ash a hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA
hit K Street, the de facto headquarters of the capitol's business lobbyists, opponents initiated an unprecedented siege on
OIRA, demanding help in suppressing Jackson and her staff. 191  OIRA staff sat through forty-seven separate meetings with
organizational representatives interested in the EPA proposal, an especially egregious number given the ample opportunities
that interested parties already had to explain their reasoned, evidence-based opposition to the EPA in a rulemaking record posted
on the worldwide web. 192  Two-thirds of these meetings involved industry and state representatives opposing the rule, while
the remainder involved environmental groups supporting it. 193
*125  At least as troubling as this relentless lobbying blitz was TVA's involvement as a well-protected “interagency”
stakeholder. Needless to say, it also opposed the rule, joined by its colleagues at the Department of Transportation, which
spoke from its perspective as a builder of highways using recycled coal ash, and the Department of Energy, which stood up
for electric utilities that own and operate coal-fired power plants, one of its most important constituencies. All three submitted
informal comments trashing the EPA proposal to OIRA, which wrote them up as confidential “interagency” communications
in direct contravention of the disclosure requirements of EO 12,866. 194  When EPA staff posted the interagency comments on
its web-based rulemaking docket, a power struggle ensued; the document was briefly pulled off the web but then restored with
a notation that such a brazen disclosure mistake would never happen again. 195  As Professor Steinzor has written previously,
federal opponents of the coal ash proposal took on the features of a posse in a classic western, riding to support the OIRA
sheriff's pursuit of the outlaw EPA. 196
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OIRA held onto the coal ash rule for seven months--well beyond the ninety-day review period allotted under EO 12,866--while
it rewrote both the rulemaking notice and the EPA's regulatory impact statement. 197  Finally, in May 2010, a fundamentally
different rulemaking notice emerged from OIRA, advancing three alternatives: (1) EPA's original option that coal ash be
regulated as a RCRA Subtitle C hazardous waste; (2) an approach that would treat coal ash as a “solid” waste under RCRA
Subtitle D when it is disposed on land, essentially leaving all regulatory decisions and enforcement to state discretion; and (3)
a so-called “D prime” option that would allow all existing coal ash disposal landfills and surface impoundments to continue to
function without change for the remainder of their useful lives. 198
*126  We are convinced that raw political considerations lie at the heart of this decision to back away from the EPA's protective
approach, thereby muddying the waters on the final outcome and sending the signal that the most stringent alternative was in
deep trouble. OIRA, however, invented an elaborate rationale for these changes that invoked what has been one of Administrator
Sunstein's central interests during his academic career--behavioral economics, or the semi-scientific study of why people
do not always appear to behave as rational actors in certain decision-making contexts. As applied to regulation, behavioral
economists attempt to overcome people's irrational preferences, or “heuristics,” through various techniques that often trump
direct government efforts to curb harmful industrial activities. 199  As mentioned earlier, electric utilities and their allies in the
coal and construction industries focused their opposition to the EPA proposal on the notion that it would create a “stigma effect”
that would destroy the recycling market because consumers of the products containing the ash would be deterred from buying
the material by its designation as a hazardous waste when it was simply disposed of in regulated landfills. 200  As a result of the
stigma effect, electric utilities would be compelled to pay significantly higher costs for disposal and their customers that now
recycled coal *127  ash would stop doing so and would instead be compelled to pay more for virgin materials. 201
OIRA's calculations of stigma costs in the Final Draft RIA came out to a whopping $233.5 billion in negative, or lost, economic
and environmental benefits at the high end of its range of estimates. 202  The calculations assumed that if the strict EPA rule
went into effect, approximately fifty-one percent of coal ash that is now recycled--some thirty-seven million tons--would be
diverted to disposal in 2012, growing to about forty-one million tons annually by 2061. 203  The fifty-one percent assumption
was never justified, and seemed at best to be a stab in the dark. But this potentially enormous price tag was extraordinary as
these things go, and it hung an albatross around the proposal's neck that dragged it into the realm of the least possible.
Whether or not the lesson history takes from this episode is that the EPA's original, more stringent coal-ash proposal was killed
for political--as opposed to cost-benefit--reasons, the chilling effect that this kind of far-fetched hypothesizing will have on the
EPA and other health and safety agencies should not be underestimated. For the first time in our experience, 204  OIRA took the
position that (1) if an agency declares an activity (disposing of CCRs in an unlined pit) or a material (CCRs themselves) to be
hazardous, (2) related industries might change their conduct based on what economists believe to be irrational anxieties about
those decisions, and (3) those “irrational” reactions might cost industry money over a 50-year period, then (4) the agency must
quantify the costs of this stigma effect and (5) add them to the other costs of the action, all of which may (6) force the agency to
pull back or terminate its efforts to protect public health. Virtually any decision to consider how toxic an under-tested chemical
may be and whether its use should be restricted, to control the disposal of any harmful waste, or to require new performance
standards for facilities that release pollutants into the environment could be found to have a stigmatizing effect on some aspect
of commerce. This would trigger elaborate calculations of the effect's economic burden that could swamp the calculations of
the benefit of regulatory controls. Given the power of this chilling effect on health, *128  safety, and environmental regulation,
the record built by OIRA with respect to the stigma effect is shallow to the point of irresponsibility.
The Final Draft RIA does not contain any citations to sources describing how behavioral scientists define and evaluate the so-
called stigma effect. It acknowledges, again without citation, that to the extent behavioral scientists have tried to quantify the
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stigma effect, they have never documented the drastic reduction assumed by OIRA's redraft--which is, that sales of recycled
coal ash will drop by fifty percent. 205  Instead, stigma is accepted as a given not on the basis of previous, well-informed research
and analysis but because affected industries intent on killing the EPA proposal claim it will occur. 206  An academic literature
on the stigma effect exists, but OIRA's economists apparently chose to ignore it.
It turns out that an impressive roster of behavioral scientists have published an entire book analyzing the stigma effect
through the prism of well-publicized controversies involving the contamination of food (mad cow disease or the discovery of
polychlorinated biphenyls in milk) or drugs (tampering with Tylenol), the siting of nuclear-waste-disposal facilities, and toxic-
waste dump sites. 207  The authors define stigma as people's revulsion against substances or practices that could prove harmful
to their health. 208
In one famous experiment, researchers dipped a “sterilized” cockroach in a glass of juice while their human subjects watched,
and then asked people to drink from the glasses; most refused all such requests. 209  Similar experiments involving poisoned
Tylenol and the tainted milk and meat that may derive from mad cows unsurprisingly *129  provided similar results: the
average person exhibits revulsion over the contamination and is anxious to avoid exposure. 210
Perhaps the OIRA economists ignored this research because the reaction of people asked to drink a contaminated beverage on
its face has very little to do with how electric utilities respond to any regulation that could cost them money. One situation
simply has very little to do with the other. It is tempting to surmise, however, that to the extent that they were familiar with this
research, the OIRA economists did not want to highlight the behavioral scientists' recommended solutions to the stigma effect.
To a person, the scientists urge government to combat stigma with public education, efforts to restore trust in government,
and--ultimately--more protective regulation. 211  Had OIRA absorbed the research and these recommendations--had it, in fact,
maintained an open mind and followed the implications of the behavioral research to its logical conclusion--the upshot might
very well have been to either dismiss the stigma effect altogether or, at the very least, to assign it a much lower number. Instead,
playing into the industry's strategy for killing the rule, OIRA ensured that EPA and Congress received the clear message that
the rule was on shaky footing within the Obama Administration, and therefore vulnerable to the final stage of blood-sport
policymaking.
C. Advertising and Astroturf
A coalition of coal and utility companies spent around thirty-five million dollars on television advertising criticizing several EPA
regulatory proposals, including the coal-ash rule. 212  One ad featured a businessman with a briefcase struggling to stay aboard
a bucking bull while the narrator observed that “too many Americans are just trying to hang onto their jobs” and wondered why
the EPA was “in a rush to *130  push regulations that would saddle Americans with higher energy costs and throw even more
of us out of work?” The narrator then urged the viewer to tell Congress that “EPA needs to slow down.” 213
As it became clear that the EPA was serious about regulating coal ash as a hazardous waste, a group called Citizens for Recycling
First appeared on the scene. Run by a consultant for the coal-ash recycling industry, it was an “Astroturf” group established
by the industry to create the impression that ordinary citizens strongly opposed regulation of coal ash as a hazardous waste.
In October 2011, the group took advantage of the White House's “We the People” program to submit a petition demanding
that the Obama Administration not designate coal ash as a hazardous waste. 214  The group's website boasted that the petition
had attracted more than 5,000 signatures, but a closer examination by the Environmental Integrity Project found that the names
were probably generated by “a piece of software or a small group of individuals.” 215
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D. Congress Strides Backwards
As is becoming standard operating procedure in high-stakes rulemaking, the industry coalition opposing the EPA rule did not
limit its work to the traditional strategies of lobbying EPA and OIRA officials and preparing voluminous comments on the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). 216  Instead, its lobbyists fanned out across Capitol Hill, asking members from states
where affected companies were located to find ways to delay or terminate the rulemaking. This new strategy was significantly
more effective following the 2010 midterm elections.
*131  The scene was set for such congressional intervention during the 2010 midterm elections, when candidates put forth
by the Tea Party faction of the Republican Party routinely blamed many of the nation's economic problems on environmental
regulation. 217  Whether or not these attacks had a decisive effect on the final vote, the electorate returned control of the House of
Representatives to a Republican Party with a vocal Tea Party faction that was determined to prevent the EPA from promulgating
more regulations. The mining and electric-utility industries contributed heavily to Republican candidates who took an anti-
regulatory stance, and they were delighted with these election results. 218
The coal and electric-utility industries hoped to persuade Congress either to prevent the EPA from finalizing pending regulations
or, if that approach failed, to force the agency to make the regulations it did finalize less burdensome. 219  In response to a
request by Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA) to nominate supposedly “job-threatening” regulations for repeal or withdrawal,
thirteen different trade associations nominated the coal-ash rule. 220  During the first nine months of 2011, mining interests
spent $16.5 million and electric utility interests spent $78.4 million on this and related lobbying activities. 221  Members of the
American Public Power Association, a trade group representing publicly owned utilities in cities like Anaheim and Nashville,
assembled in Washington, D.C. in early March 2011 to take their grievances about the EPA rules directly to individual members
of Congress. 222
The industry lobbyists were well-received by the Republican House majority. The tone of the congressional hearings on
coal ash shifted dramatically as Republican chairpersons controlled the witness list. They stacked the hearings with industry
representatives, and subjected EPA witnesses to lengthy, hostile questioning that *132  sometimes pressed the boundaries of
congressional decorum. 223  Sympathetic members supported stand-alone bills to divest the EPA of authority to regulate many
aspects of power plant pollution, including coal ash. The Republican leadership was also receptive to attempts to circumvent
the normal procedures for enacting legislation by attaching the contents of stand-alone bills to “must-pass” legislation, such
as appropriations and transportation-reauthorization legislation, which was not likely to be killed in the Senate or vetoed by
President Obama.
The first opportunity for Congress to halt EPA rulemaking was the continuing resolution that had to pass at the outset of
the 112th Congress to appropriate funds for the government agencies for the remainder of the 2011 fiscal year. 224  Because
President Obama would be very reluctant to veto the bill, triggering a government shutdown until a new continuing resolution
could be passed, the legislation was virtually veto-proof. It did, however, have to get through the Democrat-controlled Senate.
When the continuing resolution came to the floor of the House for a vote, Representative David McKinley (R-WV) offered
a so-called “limitation” rider to prevent the EPA from expending any of the appropriated funds for the purpose of classifying
coal ash as a hazardous waste. 225  This restriction would have effectively terminated the coal-ash rulemaking for the remainder
of the fiscal year. Whether the agency could resume the rulemaking at the end of FY 2011 would depend on whether the FY
2012 appropriation contained a similar rider. The full House approved the rider, along with a number of other riders aimed at
terminating ongoing EPA rulemaking initiatives. But the final deal on the continuing resolution reached among the Speaker of
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the House, Senate leaders, and President Obama removed the rider from the bill. 226  Environmental groups breathed a sigh of
relief, although they realized that the continuing resolution battle was just “an opening act” for future battles over EPA rules. 227
*133  Later that month, the Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce held a hearing on a free-standing bill entitled the Recycling Coal Combustion Residuals Accessibility Act. That Act
would have prohibited the EPA from regulating coal ash as a hazardous waste and given the states authority to regulate the
disposal of CCRs. 228  The hearing featured testimony by EPA Assistant Administrator Mathy Stanislaus who told the committee
that the problems with CCR retention ponds “could be addressed easily if disposal units were installed with proper liners,
groundwater monitoring, and fugitive dust controls with an effective government oversight framework.” 229  Underscoring the
fact that the rule would not regulate beneficial uses of coal ash in any way, he stressed the need for “an effective oversight
role to ensure CCR regulations are properly implemented and enforced.” 230  He said that the agency preferred to consider all
of the possible regulatory options, including regulating coal ash as a hazardous waste, and he complained that the bill would
take that option away from the agency. 231
Throughout the hearing, Republican congressmen took Stanislaus to task for the agency's failure to conduct an economic
analysis that specifically focused on jobs in addition to the extensive economic analysis contained in the Draft RIA for the
proposed rule. 232  Representative Cory Gardner (R-CO) berated Stanislaus for analyzing the impact of the rule on environmental
justice, but not the impact on jobs. 233  When Representative David McKinley (R-WV) pressed Stanislaus to give his opinion
as to whether coal ash was toxic, Stanislaus pointed out that the agency was “in the middle of a rulemaking,” and the toxicity
of coal ash was one of the issues that the rulemaking would resolve. 234  Alluding to the stigmatizing effect of regulating CCRs
under Subtitle C, Representative McKinley then demanded to know what “corporate liability lawyers” would “tell companies
about creating wall board for use in homes, hazardous *134  material.” 235  Stanislaus tried to explain again--to no avail--that
the EPA proposal exempted recycled coal ash used in products like wallboard and that the central issue for the rulemaking was
the characteristics of coal ash when mismanaged in a retention pond and not its characteristics when put to beneficial uses. 236
The House Energy and Commerce Committee reported out the legislation, now titled the Coal Residuals Reuse and Management
Act, in mid-July 2011. It divested the EPA of its authority to regulate CCRs and set forth general standards for state regulation
of disposal sites. 237  The EPA would retain the authority to seek an injunction to prevent an imminent hazard, but it would lack
inspection and enforcement authority over the old dump sites like the surface impoundment that collapsed at Kingston. 238  As
the bill came up for a floor vote, the White House issued a statement opposing the measure, but stopped short of threatening a
veto. 239  The full House approved the bill by a vote of 267 to 144 on October 14, 2011. 240  According to House speaker John
Boehner, the vote demonstrated that Republicans were fulfilling their promise to stop the Obama Administration from issuing
regulations that threatened jobs. 241  But two weeks after the House passed the legislation, a bluff at the We Energies' power
plant adjacent to Lake Michigan in Oak Creek, Wisconsin gave way and discharged 2,500 cubic yards of soil contaminated
with coal ash into Lake Michgan. 242  Perhaps influenced by this episode, Democrats on the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works did not even schedule a hearing for the House legislation.
House advocates soon discovered another must-pass piece of legislation: the transportation-reauthorization bill. They approved
a rider containing the text of the coal-ash bill they had previously *135  passed as a stand-alone measure. 243  Hoping that
the Senate would not remove the rider in the conference committee, industry coalition lobbyists visited each of the individual
conferees. 244  They also succeeded in persuading eighty-one representatives to sign a letter to the House conferees urging them
to insist that the rider be retained in the conference committee's bill. 245  The Utility Solid Waste Activities Group created a
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website called “Regulate Coal Ash Right” to appeal to citizens to “tell Congress to include bipartisan coal ash provisions in
the surface transportation bill.” 246  It was all for naught, however, as the Democratic senators on the conference committee
refused to go forward with a bill containing the rider. 247
Meanwhile, after suffering defeats at OIRA and Congress, environmental groups sought refuge in the courts, filing an “agency
forcing” lawsuit against the EPA seeking a court order requiring the agency to issue a final coal-ash rule by a prescribed
deadline. 248  The largest manufacturer of CCRs for beneficial use filed its own lawsuit and asked that it be consolidated with the
environmental groups' suit. 249  Fearing that the EPA would settle the lawsuit on terms favorable to the environmental groups,
the chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the chairman of its Subcommittee on Environment and
the Economy wrote a letter to EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson urging her not to settle the litigation. 250  In late June 2012, two
industry groups intervened in the lawsuit so that they would be parties to any settlement negotiations. 251
*136  Although Congress has not yet enacted legislation cutting off the coal-ash rulemaking, several near misses suggest the
battle is likely to be renewed after the 2012 national elections.
IV. Lessons and Solutions
A. Lessons
1. Disasters with No Response
As we mentioned at the outset, widely publicized, anthropogenic disasters can create a crisis atmosphere capable of opening
policy-making “windows,” as the political scientist John Kingdon described the delicate point in time when all factors are
aligned toward action. 252  Regulatory agencies always have many more issues on their plates than they can possibly address
with their limited resources; and they are increasingly intimidated by the gauntlet they must run to push proposals that well-
connected industries oppose through centralized White House review. Congress must struggle to overcome its own inertia on
regulatory issues; the laws are complex and their reauthorization has always inspired similarly intense resistance from regulated
industries. 253  Historically, disasters have cut through these Gordian knots, largely because they provided progressive activists
with the grassroots momentum needed to overcome the “collective action” problem identified by economist Mancur Olson. 254
The costs of complying with regulations are borne directly by the regulated industries, while the benefits of regulatory
protections are spread among thousands or millions of individuals, no single one of whom has a strong enough incentive to seek
regulatory change aimed at internalizing those costs. 255  But disgust at the sight of the Cuyahoga River on fire, or fear that an
American chemical plant could erupt with the lethal effect of the Union Carbide facility in Bhopal, India, historically served
to galvanize enough public support for environmental protection laws that the EPA and Congress were *137  compelled to
respond. 256  Members of Congress moved toward compromise, although the resulting legislation may be too narrow or weak
to empower the relevant agency to prevent the next tragedy.
Until recently, a catastrophe of the order of magnitude of the Kingston spill would have pushed an issue to the front of the
policymaking agenda. As the national media focused on the causes of the tragedy, advocates for the victims pointed to regulatory
failures or the inadequacy of statutes designed to prevent a second catastrophe, generating an opportunity to pressure agencies
and members of Congress into a meaningful response. 257  But the Kingston disaster, along with the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill and the Upper Big Branch mine tragedy, did not follow this long-standing historical trend. As always, victims demanded
action, the media reported on the human misery left in the wake of the three events, and Congress--at least initially--decried
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industry negligence, goaded regulators, and demanded a response. Yet Congress did not enact legislation and regulators who
tried to respond were stymied.
Whether these developments mark a new, diametrically opposed trend or a brief departure from the usual response is impossible
to determine with certainty. But we fear that the deep polarization of the nation's public affairs suggests that the human, natural,
and economic costs of such fiascos may need to rise sharply higher before dysfunctional executive and legislative branches
kick back into gear. In this final section, we explain our prognosis and suggest the conditions that would be necessary to prove
us wrong.
We are well aware, of course, that participants in regulated industries and their political allies believe that the reason the White
House and Congress fail to act is that a regulatory response is not warranted on the merits. We reject that explanation. Instead,
we believe that the sharp imbalance of economic power that gives regulated industries a louder voice than ordinary citizens and
public interest groups in both the legislative and regulatory fora lies at the root of these changes. This imbalance reached its
tipping point with the Supreme Court's decision in *138  Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 258  which raised
the stakes for political fundraising from business entities to an unprecedented level. This trend toward industry dominance
not just of the traditional administrative process, but of political arenas as well, is compounded by the public's loss of trust in
government, a phenomenon that makes galvanizing public sentiment for law reform extraordinarily difficult.
2. Industry Dominance of the Process
Empirical studies demonstrate that regulated parties dominate every stage of the rulemaking process, from pre-proposal
negotiations with the agency over the content of the rule, to submission of comments on the proposal, to judicial challenges
of the final rule. Because public interest groups have lagged far behind their industry counterparts in effort and intensity, the
agencies are under tremendous pressure to default to proposals that weaken regulatory requirements.
The Center for Public Integrity discovered that industry groups opposed to climate change legislation hired four lobbyists for
every individual member of Congress, for a total of approximately 2,340 such representatives, compared to the 185 fielded by
public interest groups. 259  This dominance on Capitol Hill is mirrored by higher rates of industry participation in administrative
proceedings. A survey of Washington-based interest groups found that individual businesses participated in over twice the
number of rulemakings as other types of organizations. 260  Another study, examining comments filed on eleven proposed
regulations at three agencies, found the same business dominance. 261  Corporations, public utilities, and trade associations filed
between 66.7% and 100% of the comments concerning EPA and National Highway Traffic Administration rules, and public
interest groups did not file any comments regarding five of the eight rules included in the study. 262
*139  In the fall of 2011, the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR), an organization that we helped found, released the most
ambitious empirical study of White House regulatory review yet conducted, covering 6,194 separate regulatory proposals and
final rules considered during the period from October 16, 2001 to June 1, 2011. 263  Over the course of the decade, OIRA
officials met 1,080 times with 5,759 participants. 264  Sixty-five percent of attendees represented industry, about five times the
number of people who appeared on behalf of public interest groups. 265  The EPA was given attention far disproportionate to its
regulatory output: a surprising 442 of the 1,080 meetings involved regulatory matters that originated at the EPA even though
the agency accounted for only eleven percent of the matters that OIRA reviewed. 266  Most troubling of all, CPR discovered that
OIRA changes eighty-four percent of EPA rules and sixty-five percent of all other rules before releasing them to the public. 267
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Not surprisingly, as the coal-ash rulemaking demonstrates, industry dominance of the process has a discernible impact on
rulemaking outcomes. One recent study of EPA rules regulating hazardous air pollutants concluded that changes to the
substance of rules in response to public comments favored industry by a five-to-one margin. 268  Professor David Driesen
examined twenty-five rules identified by a GAO study as significantly affected by centralized review, concluding that OIRA-
recommended changes reduced regulatory protections with respect to twenty-four of the rules, while the one remaining change
was neutral. 269
Industry advocates in many high-stakes rulemakings are now willing to spend millions of dollars to achieve their regulatory goals
by lobbying agency staff and members of Congress. They employ non-traditional tactics such as public relations campaigns
replete with *140  attack advertising, coordination with think tanks, media pundits, and bloggers. 270  These blood-sport
strategies, several of which were on full display during the EPA's coal-ash rulemaking, go a long way toward explaining the
failure of Congress and the EPA to put protective laws and regulations into place in the wake of the Kingston disaster. 271
If we are right that corporate dominance of national policymaking in the health and safety arena is the most important reason
for the failure to respond to disasters, why have the American people failed to respond more sharply to what many would regard
to be a corrupt state of affairs in the American political economy?
3. Loss of the Public Trust
No one was killed in the Kingston disaster, and only a few homes were destroyed. The damage was limited to a few hundred
acres of land and a couple of rivers. Mayhem of this magnitude is available on almost a daily basis as television outlets operating
on a 24-7 news cycle search for stories dramatic enough to attract viewers. A constant diet of disasters may have rendered the
American public incapable of either empathy with the victims or outrage over the callous disregard for public safety displayed
by the corporate actors who caused the harm. This sense of ennui may well have been exacerbated by government's failure to
provide adequate protective responses to serious crises so many times in the past decade--Hurricane Katrina, the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, the Upper Big Branch mining explosion--that people no longer trust government to respond when catastrophes
provide dramatic examples of the failure of self-regulation, which is the only alternative to government regulation. 272
In our view, the current distrust of governmental solutions to social problems has at least three sources. First, thirty years
of debilitating attacks on government by the conservative media echo-chamber and irresponsible congressional leaders have
convinced many Americans that government officials are by nature less competent and more corruptible than their equivalents
in the private sector. 273  Dubbed “bureaucracy bashing” by political scientists, 274  this *141  practice has “when all else fails,
kick the dog” overtones because it involves blaming bureaucrats every time something goes wrong that could conceivably
fall within the government's authority to accomplish or prevent. This narrative is especially disturbing when it combines the
American commitment to individual freedom with the suggestion that government employees are determined to deprive their
fellow citizens of their liberty. An extreme example is House Majority Whip Tom DeLay's attempt on the floor of the House
to equate EPA officials with the Gestapo. 275  Although this comparison may have lost some of its potency through constant,
mindless repetition, its use by a prominent national official should be exceptionally disturbing to those familiar with the ghastly
events of the Holocaust.
And we are not alone. The DeLay comment was made in 1995, the same year that Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In a moving speech paying homage to the 168 victims of the attack, President
Clinton said: “there is nothing patriotic about hating your country or pretending that you can love your country but despise your
Government.” 276  Although the President was specifically referring to local militias, at least one scholar before us, Professor
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Thad Hall, has argued that he was drawing a link between bureaucracy bashing in Congress and this stunning act of violence
against the civil service. 277
Second, putting aside the argument that such extreme attitudes are quite dangerous to the body politic, the varying degrees of
disdain for government officials among members of the public have produced a serious brain drain among the civil service as
well as deep cuts in its ranks. This has in turn further alienated citizens, who no longer identify public service as a noble calling.
The National Commission for the Public Service, chaired by the estimable Paul Volcker, former *142  chair of the Federal
Reserve Board, addressed this reality in 2003 without mincing any words:
Trust in government--strong after World War II, with the United States assuming international leadership
and meeting domestic challenges--has eroded. Government's responsiveness, its efficiency, and too often
its honesty are broadly challenged as we enter a new century. The bonds between our citizens and our
public servants, essential to democratic government, are frayed even as the responsibilities of government
at home and abroad have increased. Government work ought to be a respected source of pride. All too
frequently it is not. . . . The notion of public service, once a noble calling proudly pursued by the most
talented Americans of every generation, draws an indifferent response from today's young people and repels
many of the country's leading private citizens. 278
Finally, thirty years of budget cuts and debilitating ideological attacks on regulatory agencies have rendered them incapable of
delivering the protections that we rightly expect. 279  The EPA, which started out on such a positive and energetic note after
Kingston, was ultimately beaten into submission, at least for the foreseeable future.
People are not wrong, of course, when they express disillusionment with the government's performance, especially during
a crisis. But disappointment does not have to lead to distrust. Long-standing Washington Post columnist and reporter, Jim
Hoagland, once wrote:
Americans distrust government's powers and motives. They immediately get the joke that has a federal inspector or a state
administrator fatuously saying, “We're from the government and here to help.” Such suspicion is a healthy instinct--but one
that is being carried to destructive and demagogic lengths. 280
If any country in the world is equipped to maintain both a healthy suspicion of and a sense of humor about government, all
without succumbing to ideologues who are trying to destroy its capacity to protect those who need the help, it is this one,
however far the ship of state has rolled to the intemperate starboard in recent years.
*143  B. Solutions
1. Restoring Public Trust
The foregoing explanations for the failure of either Congress or the EPA to provide an effective response to the Kingston
catastrophe may leave the reader wondering what can stimulate protective governmental action if crises generated by dramatic
disasters are no longer capable of doing so. If our society cannot learn from the mistakes that become apparent in the most
extreme catastrophes, how can it possibly avoid their future recurrence? And if government has become so ineffective that it
can no longer require risk-fraught industries to prevent these events, to what institutions can the potential victims of the next
disaster turn?
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To a large degree, we share this feeling of helplessness, but we take some comfort in the fact that identifying the cause of a
disease is the first step toward deriving a cure. In this part of the Article we do not pretend to have a cure, and the suggestions
that we offer here may seem quixotic to some. But we offer them as a first step on the way back to a political economy in which
anthropogenic disasters are less frequent and government reacts to the disasters that do occur by putting into place regulatory
programs designed to prevent similar disasters in the future.
We believe that very little progress toward effective governmental responses to environmental disasters is likely if we do not
first restore public trust in the ability of government to address social problems. And the first step toward restoring public trust is
to rebuild the governmental institutions that have the responsibility to protect people from environmental disasters. At the same
time, supporters of proactive governmental intervention must displace the business community's well-honed, anti-government
narrative with a compelling counter-narrative capable of restoring public trust in government. 281
2. Rebuilding Government
Regulatory agencies like the EPA have little chance of regaining either their self-respect or the power to control corporate
misconduct unless the White House and Congress remove themselves from the arena where regulatory decisions, guided by
decades of carefully  *144  crafted law, were meant to be made. Doors must shut all over Washington, D.C. The simple act, in all
its iterations, of appealing to the administrator of OIRA or the chair of an agency's congressional appropriations subcommittee
must become an outlier that has an appropriate smell of corruption each time a well-heeled corporate lobbyist attempts to travel
that route. 282  Or, to put it another way, the blood-sport approach to influencing regulatory decisions must come to an end.
We have two tough audiences to convince that these new tools, so treasured by the people that use them, will bring all of us to
a bad end: (1) the thousands of tacticians who earn good livings deploying their blood-sport strategies and the senior corporate
executives who sponsor their activities and (2) the political advisers to the president.
Our message has three parts. First, in regulatory wars of attrition, with constantly increasing sums of money needed to derail
rulemaking initiatives, the first victims may be the hapless millions of people who live near coal-ash dumps or who have
Chinese drywall in their homes. Sooner or later, though, industries will end up squaring off against other industries, and the
cost of the battles will spiral out of control. In a recent article outlining blood-sport strategies, Professor McGarity describes
an extremely expensive and chaotic fight between bankers and retailers over debit card fees that punished both sides and left
neither the clear victor. 283
One mainstay in the business community's argument against regulation is that, to compete effectively in a global marketplace,
companies need a degree of certainty that constantly changing rules do not provide. Yet the business community is far more
dependent on the stability that a mature regulatory program can provide than its representatives generally care to admit. Even
in the era of shrunken government envisioned by Fredrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Grover Norquist, governmental
regulation will persist to make and enforce the rules that make markets possible by providing a level competitive playing
field and by giving consumers confidence that they and their families will not be cheated or injured by irresponsible *145
companies. 284  The question the business community now faces is whether it is better off rolling the dice in increasingly
expensive political gambles over the content of the regulations that must inevitably govern the global marketplace or returning
to a regulatory system in which expert judgment plays a prominent role and long-standing statutory policies are afforded due
respect.
Second, politicians who are inclined to regard shrinking government as the solution to every social problem must be prepared
to accept the responsibility for future disasters when the consequences fall on their own constituents. As Congress continues to
reduce the resources available to regulatory agencies and as individual members of Congress continue to intervene in the blood-
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sport battles that rage over individual rulemaking initiatives, it will become increasingly implausible to blame the bureaucrats
in charge of hamstrung programs for future catastrophes. Additionally, advocates for consumers and the environment will be
able to point a finger with increasing plausibility at the politicians who accepted large campaign contributions at the same time
that they were divesting regulatory agencies of their protective powers. If they would like to avoid savage attacks from the
victims of the next tragedy brought on by a failure of the regulatory system, these politicians may be well-advised to rein in
their own overly aggressive attacks on regulatory agencies during the battles over regulation.
Finally, the president must return the core responsibility for managing regulatory initiatives to the political appointees he selects
to lead the agencies. Treating highly competent professionals like Lisa Jackson as little more than symbolic payoffs to key
political constituencies, while divesting them of effective control over the most important initiatives on their agencies' agendas,
is a strategy that is doomed to failure over the long haul. Not only will an administration that adopts this strategy take a justified
beating in the media when the next disaster happens, it will find it far more difficult to persuade qualified people to serve in
important administration jobs in the future.
Unfortunately, the presidential inclination to locate all momentous decisions within the White House walls has increased *146
dramatically during the last two decades. Presidents understandably worry about loyalty of the civil service, and they are
instinctively reluctant to trust senior career officials, many of whom have developed their own power bases within agencies
and on Capitol Hill. Quashing ongoing initiatives by the civil service is, unfortunately, far easier for a new White House to
accomplish than inspiring bureaucrats to act aggressively in the public interest. Presidents have dramatically expanded the
number of handpicked and loyal staffers who work within the ambit of the White House, organizing them into various “councils”
with broad and shifting portfolios. The consequences of centralized review are that career employees must report up a long
chain of authority before taking significant action and that regulated industries have multiple opportunities for political appeals
to reverse decisions they lost at the agency level.
As one of the oldest and most entrenched institutions of centralized review, OIRA poses a formidable bottleneck for protective
regulation in both Republican and Democratic administrations. Its staff is composed mostly of economists with training in the
details of cost-benefit analysis but scant experience with the other disciplines, such as science and engineering, needed to inform
regulatory policy making. 285  At the same time, the agencies have developed their own sophisticated capacity to analyze the
costs and benefits of rules and are perfectly capable of advising the political appointee who leads the relevant agency of broader
policy implications of particular rulemaking initiatives.
Centralized review hides policymaking behind closed doors, wastes limited government resources, complicates agency priority-
setting, demoralizes civil servants, and costs the nation dearly in lost lives, avoidable illness and injury, and destruction
of irreplaceable natural resources. President Obama's preoccupation with centralized review has undermined an important
symbolic and programmatic goal of his potentially transformative presidency because it has obscured the urgency of
reinvigorating health, safety, and environmental agencies. Left uncorrected, this mistake may define his historical legacy in the
same negative way that a similar preoccupation with control has already defined the legacy of his predecessor, George W. Bush.
*147  3. Changing the Narrative
Business groups have gained a great deal of political traction with a powerful narrative based on economic freedom. They
claim that economic freedom is a necessary precondition to political and individual freedom, and they easily adapt the concept
to corporate entities as well as individuals. 286  Freedom is a widely shared human value, but so is security. Most Americans
understand that economic freedom allows corporations to develop innovative products, to match those products to consumer
desires, and to provide useful services to consumers at the lowest cost. But they also know that corporations can use that freedom
irresponsibly to defraud their customers and harm their neighbors. Since corporations cannot be motivated by concerns for
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others unless those others contribute to their bottom lines, government must provide for the economic and physical security of
its citizens. Proponents of protective governmental regulation have an opportunity to enlarge this concept to include the shared
value of economic and physical security that should be at least as compelling as the business community's focus on its own
freedom, especially in an era when corporations are making record profits but not creating jobs at nearly the same pace. 287
During the Public Interest Era of the late 1960s and early 1970s, consumer and environmental advocates invoked a narrative
that focused on corporate responsibility for the harms caused by dangerous products and activities. During the past thirty years,
the business community has successfully redirected the corporate responsibility narrative into a story about how companies
can voluntarily adopt more responsible approaches out of concern for corporate image and the health of the economy. In the
wake of the recent confluence of crises, however, this perversion of the corporate responsibility narrative has lost its vitality,
and public interest advocates have an opportunity to reinvigorate it in support of stronger governmental protections. 288
*148  When the investigations that invariably follow a disaster conclude that a company's irresponsible conduct played a role
in causing the disaster, both the victims and the general public typically demand that the company be held accountable for its
wrongdoing. A regulatory agency with an aggressive and well-financed enforcement division is one institution that can hold
corporations and their officers and employees accountable for their misdeeds. Thus, corporate accountability could provide the
foundation for a third branch of the narrative about the role of government in society.
Finally, disasters demonstrate in a dramatic way the social costs of irresponsible corporate activities. In the absence of a perfectly
functioning tort system, regulatory agencies are in the best position to minimize the social costs of company-caused disasters that
society ultimately bears through increased insurance premiums and taxes invested in Medicare and Medicaid. Thus, a social-
costs narrative should resonate fairly robustly in a declining economy characterized by large budget deficits and few new taxes.
These four narratives, and perhaps others, offer an alternative to the economic freedom narrative that has dominated the political
economy for the last three decades. If carefully nourished and deftly deployed during disasters, these narratives can contribute
to the daunting task of rebuilding trust in government in general and regulatory agencies in particular.
V. Conclusion
The failure of Congress and the Obama Administration to react to the Kingston disaster with either protective legislation
or regulation may be part of a larger phenomenon that does not bode well for the resuscitation of the health, safety, and
environmental regulatory system in this country. Congress did not enact legislation in response to the April 2010 Deepwater
Horizon disaster, and the regulatory response consisted largely of reorganizing and renaming the pitifully ineffectual agency
that had regulated deepwater drilling in the past. 289  The same failure to respond accompanied the Upper Big Branch explosion
of April 2010 and the massive Kingston Tennessee spill of December 2008. If public trust in government remains at its
current low level and the institutions responsible for protecting citizens from environmental disasters remain in their current
dysfunctional state, we can expect more dramatic disasters in *149  the future. If, however, supporters of good government
and sound environmental protection can create a new narrative to counter an increasingly implausible anti-government creed,
and if Congress can be persuaded to provide adequate resources to agencies like the EPA, we may find ourselves on the road
toward a government that protects us from domestic disasters as well as it protects us against foreign attack.
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